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For some time now, a certain problem has been causing quite a stir 
in the Protestant intellectual world of Europe and America and has 
become the subject of a heated debate involving not only theologians 
and church members but also philosophical circles and the general 
public. This problem concerns the idea of “demythologizing” which 
Rudolf Bultmann proposed originally in connection with New Testa­
ment hermeneutics.
The New Testament is conditioned by the age in which it was written 
and includes a great deal of the mythological imagery underlying the an­
cient world. For the modern man and woman living and thinking in an 
age conditioned by the scientific view of the world, this imagery poses 
a considerable stumbling block. To remove the obstacle, modern 
theology needs to dismantle this mythical imagery and extract its im­
mutable core. Bultmann has tried to effect this demythologizing in 
New Testament exegesis with the aid of Heidegger’s existential philos­
ophy. Heidegger sees human life as Existenz and employs an “existen­
tialist” method of interpretation to clarify the meaning of human exis­
tence in its timeliness and fitness from the standpoint of fundamental 
ontology.
This is not to say that Bultmann’s views can be reduced to Heideg- 
gerian philosophy. For Bultmann, without God we live in “corrup­
tion” and meaninglessness. It is only in the awareness of one’s in­
significance that one is open to the activity of God. Furthermore, in so 
far as divine revelation in Christ demands a decision of the individual,
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it is also a call. Only by following this call through faith can one be 
saved. This is much the same as Luther’s statement, “justification be­
fore God through faith alone.” Thus we may say that Bultmann’s aim 
is to demythologize with the help of existentialist interpretation, and to 
open up a horizon wherein modem men and women can once again 
have access to the faith of the Reformers. As Bultmann puts it:
The myth must be studied or interpreted by asking the ques­
tion: which understanding of human being, of human 
existence, is expressed in the myth? This is what I call the exis­
tentialist interpretation: Which understanding of human 
existence, even after the disappearance or destruction of the 
mythical concepts, is still a permanent and relevant possibility 
for understanding human existence? The problem of de­
mythologizing is a problem of hermeneutics, a problem of 
interpretation, and the principle of interpretation is inquiry 
into the understanding of existence contained in myth in 
general, and what is of special interest to us, in the mytho­
logical statements of the New Testament (Die christliche 
Hoffnung und das Problem der Entmythologisierung, 
p. 50).
There is a wide variety of opinion on this approach, which has pro­
duced a vast body of literature. I shall not go into that matter here, but 
shall restrict myself to two or three basic issues related to the problem 
of demythologizing.
The problem of demythologizing did not originate with Bultmann. 
Throughout the history of Christianity, it has always been present, if 
only in latent form. In a sense, it was present from the very beginning 
of Christianity. Bultmann, like other scholars, has admitted this on 
more than one occasion. Long before the emergence of Christianity 
from the midst of a “heathen” world, attempts have been made to 
emancipate people from mythological ideas and the mythological view 
of the world. With the Greeks this attempt was part of the newly 
awakened “reason” in scientific-philosophical thought. But the more 
that Christianity deepened its contacts with the heathen world, the 
more a complicated conflict grew up between faith laden with myth and 
reason stripping away this myth to awaken to selfhood. The long 
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history of the Christian Church and theology is basically the history of 
this conflict.
In the Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the natural sciences produced a new world view, emancipated both 
from religion and metaphysics. With the emergence of an empirical 
and positivistic understanding of society, history, and the human per­
son, this conflict took on an especially profound and intense form. A 
method of thinking that rightly deserves to be called a carefully con­
structed demythologizing spread throughout the world of learning, ex­
cept for religion. It was not a matter of hermeneutics, as in the case of 
Bultmann, but of real life.
The Christian Church and Christian theology assumed a basically 
defensive position against this current, viewing it as a risk to the very 
survival of the faith. Of course, in Schleiermacher and other liberal 
theologians, one finds a vigorous attempt to carry out a reconstruction 
of dogma that would take into account the new intellectual climate, but 
their efforts did not even come close to the total demythologizing of 
real life that was about to be achieved in the profane world outside. At 
the same time, such attempts were bound to lead away from the path 
opened up by the reformers and to appear more and more as a danger 
to the faith.
In the world of theology, therefore, demythologizing has always 
been unavoidable, but beyond a certain threshold provokes a crisis of 
faith and a fear that the foundations are crumbling. Each new attempt 
at demythologizing provokes a reaction that blocks its progress. This 
seems to be the dilemma that has plagued Christian theology until the 
present day. Of course, Christian theology has not always been fully 
aware of the nature of the dilemma, and in a sense, is afraid to face it.
This is the background against which Bultmann’s approach must be 
seen. There is no way, as far as I can see, for Bultmann to deviate from 
the way liberal theology formulates the question, since he always 
comes back to reformulating the basic concerns of liberal theology. In 
challenging the mythological concepts that continue to dominate pre­
sent day theology, he hopes to revive the dreams of the reformers, in 
direct contrast to liberal theology.
It is not hard to understand why Bultmann’s novel approach was en­
thusiastically embraced by many theologians, especially those of the 
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younger generation, as a way to satisfy their own hidden needs. Mean­
while, his approach has come under violent attack by many contem­
poraries for striking at the roots of the faith and forcing theology into 
a crisis of survival. This is not at all surprising when we recall that 
Bultmann derives his approach from Heideggerian existentialist herme­
neutics.
While this problem has lain hidden deep under the surface of Chris­
tianity from the beginning, it has not been an issue for Buddhism. In 
fact, the very posture of the problem that lifts Buddhism up and away 
from the problem by opening up a completely new religious horizon 
actually draws a line that distinguishes Buddhism from all other 
religions. At the same time, the vitality which Christianity continues to 
exhibit draws its sustenance from the hidden menace this problem 
poses. In the face of the energetic and wide-reaching debate over 
demythologizing, Buddhism, in its present tepid and inactive state, 
always seems to be like a kind of geological relic from the past.
II
The question of what myth is, i.e., the question of its content and 
scope of the notion of myth, consumes a great deal of time in the 
debate over demythologizing. For his part, Bultmann locates “the char­
acteristic feature of the mythological concept” in the “making of the 
other-worldly into the this-worldly” (Verdiesseitigung des Jenseitigen). 
This definition has been criticized as too vague. Bultmann calls con­
cepts based on an old world view mythic, but critics of this definition 
maintain that myth and world view are two different things. Their 
counterargument can be briefly summarized as follows. When a 
transcendental reality comes into contact with the spatial-temporal 
world, it can be represented only symbolically, with the aid of this- 
worldly objects. The inevitable result of this need to express the other­
worldly reality is myth. This line of contention destroys the argument 
that myth is a stumbling block for a modern intellect permeated by the 
sciences. The problem is not that myth is founded on an old world 
view, but rather in the fact that the modern intellect itself is blind to the 
reality of the other world. The modern intellect has come under the 
spell of critical analysis, and we must therefore inquire into the limits 
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of scientific knowledge. This is the main thrust of the criticism leveled 
at Bultmann by theologians like Emil Brunner and philosophers like 
Karl Jaspers.
Other criticism of the ambiguity of Bultmann’s notion of myth may 
also be briefly mentioned. See for example, the position of F. K. 
Schumann as found in the book cited above. Here, Schumann says that 
the gods of antiquity are at home in the same world with human be­
ings, that they are therefore immanent in the world and are never 
something purely other-worldly for the human person. The God of the 
Old Testament, however, is other-worldly in respect to this world and 
to human beings. In speaking of what is this-worldly or other-worldly, 
however, one must always bear in mind that the imagery of the Bible is 
different from other kinds of imagery. For this reason, the general no­
tion of myth that Bultmann uses to define the nature of mythological 
language and which gives expression to the other-worldly through the 
use of this-worldly concepts and images, proves to be unsatisfactory. 
In the Bible, every myth in the message coming to us from the transcen­
dent is exploded and overcome. (Overcoming the myth therefore has 
nothing to do with the problem of world view; myth is not overcome 
through a world view!) It is just as impossible to speak as directly 
about coming, about salvation, and therefore about the beginning and 
end of the world as it is to speak about other things. In every case, the 
Christian message and Christian theology is forced to use mythological 
language, but the mythological terms must be used in such a way that 
the myth is overcome at the same time. The mythological imagery must 
be endowed with a new sense. These are the general lines of argumenta­
tion in the criticism against Bultmann.
If Bultmann’s critics admit the inevitability of borrowing mytholog­
ical concepts and likewise emphasize the necessity of overcoming these 
concepts, there would at first seem to be no real difference between 
their criticism and Bultmann’s own standpoint. Bultmann, too, has 
no desire to simply retain the mythological concept, but wants to in­
terpret it from the position of how faith understands human existence, 
and in this way expose the core meaning of the myth. However, closer 
examination reveals an essential difference between these two view­
points, however similar they may appear at first. With all their em­
phasis on the need to overcome mythological imagery, Bultmann’s 
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critics insist on retaining the use of mythological language as indispen­
sable. In their view, the only way in which the purely other-worldly in 
the true sense of the word and its connection to the this-worldly can be 
described is through mythological language. This necessarily leads to 
the routine preservation of all mythological concepts related to the 
purely other-worldly that abound in the Bible. There is a certain conser­
vatism behind the criticism here that shrouds the matter in still another 
sort of ambiguity.
Bultmann’s critics maintain that the myth must be 44overcome” and 
endowed with a “new meaning.” Now what do they really mean here 
by “new meaning”? Must the new meaning be restated in mythological 
terms? If so, then all talk of overcoming the myth is meaningless. Or is 
it a question of bringing this “new meaning” to light without employ­
ing mythical terms? If that is the case, one can no longer insist on 
the need for mythical terms to describe the other-worldly. Bultmann 
himself has pointedly demonstrated the ambiguity of his critics: what 
in the world does it mean to say that the mythological language must be 
overcome and exploded in order to emancipate the new meaning con­
tained in mythological imagery? As Bultmann concludes, “the new 
meaning cannot be restated in mythological language, for that would 
obviously be absurd; one would then have to demythologize again and 
again ad infinitum” (op. cit., p. 50). In Bultmann’s opinion, the mean­
ing of the myth must be expressed in a demythologized manner and the 
only method that can do this is the existentialist interpretation of the 
human person. Here we see what Bultmann really means by de­
mythologizing. Bultmann’s approach implies a subversion of conven­
tional biblical exegesis. A fundamental gap exists between Bultmann’s 
understanding of demythologizing and those who wish to maintain the 
positive indispensable significance of the myth under some form or 
another. When we consider this fundamental gap, the criticism of 
Bultmann’s definition of myth as vague becomes merely secondary.
At any rate, the question of what parts of Christianity are mytho­
logical statements is clearly a central theme for Bultmann. Bultmann 
asks, for example, “But what of the resurrection? Is it not a mythical 
event pure and simple?” (Kerygma and Myth, p. 38.) He later contin­
ues: “The resurrection itself is not an event of past history. All that 
historical criticism can establish is the fact that the first disciples came 
to believe in the resurrection” (p. 42). Since the resurrection of Christ 
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is central to Christianity, it is not all difficult to imagine the signifi­
cance of Bultmann’s statements and the shock effect they have had.
But that is not all. In his debate with Bultmann, F. K. Schumann, 
maintains that mythological imagery is the only means of expression at 
our disposal. Schumann claims that when we call God “Father” 
and Christ “Son of God” we are employing a mythological manner of 
speaking. The talk of a “coming” God and an “acting” God comes 
from the vocabulary of mythological language, “because in its origins 
the expression ‘God’ is a mythological expression” (op. cit.» p. 41). If 
the expression “God” itself is mythological, it goes without saying that 
we cannot help using mythological language. At the same time, 
Schumann claims that even while retaining the mythological expression 
“God,” the Christian message and Christian theology explode it, over­
come it and endow it with new meaning. But there is a fundamental am­
biguity here, as Bultmann has also pointed out. What happens when 
the new meaning supposedly contained in the myth must be restated in 
mythological language? If “God” and “Son of God” are mythological 
expressions, how can the meaning of these terms be expressed in a new, 
demythologized manner? Is it possible to do so within the bounds of 
Christianity or at least within the limits of the Christian tradition as it 
has been handed down to the present? Or does it go beyond these limits 
and require an entirely new form of Christianity? This is a fundamen­
tal problem for Bultmann. In essence, however, it is also a problem la­
tent in Christianity from the very beginning, a problem that is only just 
now coming to a head. We will therefore do well to briefly examine 
Bultmann’s views in this regard.
Ill
In his essay, “New Testament and Mythology,” Bultmann writes:
We have now outlined a programme for the demythologizing 
of the New Testament. Are there still any surviving traces 
of mythology? There certainly are for those who regard all 
language about an act of God or of a decisive, eschatological 
event as mythological. But this is not mythology in the tradi­
tional sense, not the kind of mythology which has become an­
tiquated with the decay of the mythical world view. For the 
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redemption of which we have spoken is not a miraculous 
supernatural event, but a historical event wrought out in 
time and space (Kerygma and Myth, p. 43).
Replying to Bultmann in his own essay, Julius Schniewind takes 
issue with this statement. Schniewind emphasizes that any talk about 
God and sin in the fall of the human race must appear as a myth per se, 
not just to “the modern person.” According to Schniewind, by not 
recognizing this and carrying it through consistently, Bultmann does 
not do justice to the formulation of the question (Kerygma and Myth, 
p. 54). To this Bultmann responds:
... to speak of faith in the living God and in his presence in 
Christ is pure myth unless these things are given an existen- 
tial/sf (N.B., not “existent/a/”) interpretation. This explains 
why I deny that Christianity is intrinsically mythological. It 
would be true to say that natural man finds it to be pure skan- 
dalon precisely when it is made intellectually intelligible to 
him. The Christian preacher can demand faith only when he 
has demonstrated sin and grace to be real possibilities of 
human life, and their denial and repudiation to be unbelief 
and guilt. It is the great merit of the existentialist interpreta­
tion that it makes this clear (Kerygma and Myth, p. 105).
We may conclude from this exchange that Bultmann does recognize 
and keep open the possibility of regarding the divine revelation in 
Christ as myth. Of course, Bultmann defines the reason why divine 
revelation is myth in a different way than it is defined in a conventional 
myth deriving from the old world view. For him, God’s revelation, 
God’s eschatological acting is myth insofar as it is not given an existen­
tialist interpretation. Only in the existentialist interpretation of myth 
does God’s eschatological acting become a genuine skandalon for the 
natural man or woman, that is, it besets a man or woman as a skan­
dalon that can only be overcome through the decision of faith. For 
Bultmann the acting of God puts an end to the world as “this world.” 
A man or woman comes into the picture as the “new man or woman.” 
This in turn means that the acting of God makes human existence 




From this standpoint, confession of sin and faith in God’s grace 
become “the possibility of my existence,” while unbelief is nothing 
other than the rejection of this possibility. For the natural man or 
woman living in a “worldly” manner, this is something that can only 
be seen as a paradox and a skandalon. In short, unless talk about sin 
and God has the character of a genuine skandalon that places the 
natural man or woman at a fork in the road where they must choose be­
tween the possibility and the impossibility of his existence, it remains a 
simple myth.
But why does Bultmann use the expression “myth” here? If, as men­
tioned above, he does not use the expression in reference to the ancient 
world view, he perhaps uses it to indicate what he calls “making the 
other-worldly this worldly.” But if that is the case, how does it relate to 
his contention that “the new meaning of myth cannot be restated in 
mythological language”? Can the interpretation of myth take on a 
form of expression different from the confession of faith and what it 
states, if the confession of sin and the confession of faith in the act of 
God have been transferred from the world of myth into the world of 
demythologizing with the aid of the existentialist interpretation? Can a 
statement such as the phrase “acting of God” be abandoned? By retain­
ing this expression, the acting of God remains a myth. Or does the ques­
tion whether the acting of God is a myth depend on whether it is given 
an existentialist interpretation or not? If so, then it does not depend on 
the way it is conceived or expressed, and the expression “acting of 
God” may in no way be given up. The acting of God could then be con­
sidered in the real sense as a salvation event that is a historical fact. 
Bultmann himself says in the above quotation that “the act of redemp­
tion is an historical event wrought out in time and space.” In this case a 
historical event would simply have occurred as a “making the other­
worldly this-worldly.” But then, the fact and the statement about this 
fact could hardly be considered apart from each other. If the acting of 
God takes place as an event in time and space, can it be expressed 
without using this-worldly terms? Is there not an inescapable need for 
mythical terms? That would bring us right back to the criticism of 
those theologians and philosophers described above, and the question 
of how myth can be overcome and how it can be endowed with new 
meaning would remain ambiguous and unanswered.
In moving back and forth between the two opposing approaches to 
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the problem of myth, it seems as though we have come to something 
like a stalemate in Christian theology. The complexity of this stalemate 
underlies Christianity from its beginnings and throughout its entire 
history. Bultmann’s daring approach to the problem touches this 
stalemate at the core and has brought it to light. It is only natural that 
the Christian churches and theologians should perceive in it an impend­
ing danger and that a heated debate should ensue. When the act of 
God, sin, and God, are included in the myth problem, it is no longer 
possible to avoid this stalemate as long the debate stays within the 
present bounds.
The question we have discussed here is essentially the old problem of 
the conflict that exists between the standpoint of religious faith and 
that of philosophy. This has become apparent in Bultmann’s existen­
tialist interpretation. But we must now ask what standpoint do we need 
to take in order to fully emancipate the essence of myth in the religious 
framework?
IV
I would now like to present my own view on the problem of myth. 
My position will no doubt go beyond the framework of the conven­
tional views of “orthodox” Christianity, but I believe it provides the 
only possibility of finding a religious solution for the problem of myth. 
To develop my position, 1 will cite the example of the one Christian 
dogma that most bears the character of the “mythological,” namely 
the notion of the immaculate conception as it relates to the birth of 
Christ.1
1 By “immaculate conception,” the author means the conception of Jesus Christ 
through the Holy Spirit, i.e, the virgin birth of Jesus Christ. The dogma of the im­
maculate conceptio proclaimed by Pope Pius IX in 1854 refers to the immaculate con­
ception of Mary in the womb of her mother, St. Anne.
It is safe to assume that in antiquity the immaculate conception of 
Christ was naively believed as a literal fact. But it is clear that the 
modern man and woman are no longer able to believe it as a fact in the 
usual sense of the word. I still remember how several years ago an 
American pastor attracted vehement criticism from the general public 
when he claimed that the virgin birth must be believed as a literal fact. 
Even many of those people who believe a series of other facts about sal­
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vation like the “Incarnation” as actual historical events are critical of 
the immaculate conception, or at least remain silent in the debate. The 
same tendency can also be seen among theologians. But since the doc* 
trine of the immaculate conception maintains that God became human 
in Jesus, we are dealing here with the incarnation of God. We must 
therefore keep in mind that the conception resulting in Mary’s pregnan­
cy was different from every ordinary conception. The idea of concep­
tion through the Holy Spirit is simply taken for granted here, otherwise 
the term “Son of God” could not have come into use. As a result, both 
notions, the Incarnation and the virginal conception, are inextricably 
connected. One conditions the other, for if we accept one notion, we 
must take the other as well. Because the Incarnation of God is a fun­
damental and essential part of the Christian faith, the immaculate con­
ception must necessarily be connected to it. But what happens when an 
immaculate conception is proved impossible by modern science?
Theologians today seem to answer this question by bringing in two 
completely different notions of “fact.” As they would say, if the asser­
tion that God has entered into bodily existence is accepted and treated 
as a fact in the usual sense, it can only be considered as an absurd im­
possibility. The normal human intellect (and science) is constituted in 
such a way that it can comprehend only those events whose ground and 
causes lie in the nature of this world alone. Now the Incarnation 
describes an event whereby an absolutely transcendent reality breaks 
into our world. As such an event, it is a historical fact, a fact of the 
revelation of God made possible through God’s initiative. But this 
fact—-that it is a fact and is therefore the sense of what is here called 
fact—opens itself only in faith. As the saying goes, “Credo quia absur- 
dum.” Behind the dimensions in which we deal with what we call 
“facts,” there lies another completely different dimension. It is in the 
background of “world” history that the horizon of salvation history, 
which encompasses world history, is formed. To say that the Incarna­
tion is a historical fact means that it is a fact grounded and originating 
in this dimension. This, in general, is how theologians today seem to 
approach the problem. In trying to understand their categories of 
thought, we must consider the immaculate conception to be a historical 
fact in this same sense.
But this entails establishing as true fact an event that contradicts cir­
cumstances accepted as true by modern science, and we now have two 
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different statements about one and the same event. In the late Middle 
Ages there appeared the doctrine of the “double truth.” What we have 
just described above is a new kind of “double truth.” But if there can 
be two different ways of looking at one and the same process, then the 
“secular” (scientific) viewpoint must be given exactly the same con­
sideration as the theological viewpoint. Along with the theological idea 
of the Incarnation of God and the immaculate conception one must 
also accept the other idea, i.e, that Jesus came into the world through 
the sexual intercourse of his father and mother: the idea of his “not-im- 
maculate” conception. Only then would any attempt to solve this prob­
lem achieve its full import. But theologians do not seem to be prepared 
to draw this conclusion. While claiming that the faith-reality which 
they teach cannot be grasped in its substance by the natural intellect 
and its sciences, they are not willing to accept the birth of Jesus 
through a human father and from a non-virginal mother. However con­
sistently the facts of faith are treated, this position now becomes incon­
sistent, because it ignores the standpoint which the opposing party, 
standing on the basis of science, accepts and must accept.
The upshot of all this is that not only scientists, but also the general 
public influenced by science, consider all matters of belief presented by 
theologians as pure superstition. A philosopher might recognize the 
“outpouring of the Holy Spirit” as the “spiritual” renewal of an in­
dividual, but the virginal conception through the outpouring of the Ho­
ly Spirit can be nothing but pure myth. In a word, the two standpoints 
cannot coexist as simply as the theologians might think. No matter how 
much one might talk of overcoming the myth, of giving it a new mean­
ing, it is impossible to dismiss the fact that the standpoints of faith 
and science are mutually exclusive. Should traditions like the virgin 
birth be described and dismissed as simple superstition? Or should 
the “spiritual” renewal be recognized, but the conception through 
the Holy Spirit be eliminated as myth? Because the content of the 
myth declares that from birth, from the very beginning of his life, a 
man was born infused by the Spirit, the myth describes more than 
a simple “spiritual” renewal. Is there no way to give the myth new 
meaning?
There is a way, but only if the conception resulting from sexual rela­
tions according to the viewpoint of present day science and immaculate 
conception are recognized as two absolutely contradictory but coter­
12
A BUDDHIST VOICE
minous incidents. The woman who has conceived and has thus lost her 
virginity, must at the same time remain a virgin. If we understand this 
as the new “meaning” of the myth, in every “maculate,” or “stained,” 
woman there would always be a final dimension that is wiped of 
each and every stain. It is therefore unacceptable to split body and 
spirit into two parts and to understand the whole in a spiritual way 
whereby the woman “stained” in the physiological sphere is unstained 
in the spiritual sphere. In the problem of the virgin birth we are dealing 
with the locus of the physiological-natural, and not the spiritual. The 
phenomenon that we define and attempt to understand with the word 
“staining” must be seen from the unity and the whole that each human 
being is before it is split into the two spheres of the natural and the 
spiritual. This staining must be understood from the ground in which 
every woman is a whole and self-contained human being. The cir­
cumstance that the woman, however stained she may be, is at the same 
time unstained, thus belongs to that final dimension indicated above. 
When the whole is divided into the two spheres of the natural and the 
spiritual, various distinctions can be made. For example, a person im­
pure in the area of the physiological-natural can be pure in the area of 
the spiritual; a person can be impure in both areas or pure in both 
areas; or a person can be pure in the area of the physiological-natural, 
but impure in the spiritual. But we are discussing a purity that lies in 
the original nature of the person prior to all those distinctions, a purity 
of absolute “non-differentiation.” We are dealing with the absolute 
purity present in the essence of human being in face of all natural puri­
ty and impurity, all spiritual purity and impurity. A man or woman 
may lose his or her purity in the corporeal and in the spiritual areas, 
but he or she still possesses that original Puritas.
Our discussion here has obviously transcended the dimensions of 
the natural and the spiritual. Yet it is impossible for us to imagine 
something in ourselves which, isolated from the natural and the 
spiritual, exists separately for itself. The absolutely unstainable part 
(of the person) does indeed completely transcend the unstained or 
stained corporeal-spiritual being, but in no way does it separate itself 
from this being. It is something entirely different from this being, but 
it is not an entirely different “something.” The absolutely unstainable 
and the corporeal-spiritual being are two and at the same time entirely 
one; entirely one and yet at the same time two. We will discuss this ap­
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parent play on words in what follows. The transcendent, or what we 
have just called the absolutely unstainable, is in any case in no way to be 
conceived of as transcendental in the sense of the “one” in which 
the corporeal and the spiritual come to an end or from which they 
emanate. When we limit our considerations to the corporeal-physiologi­
cal, (the virgin birth is, after all, primarily a physiological problem), we 
must not forget that we can conceive of the occurrence of physiological 
processes only as something inseparable from that fundamental unity 
in the nature of the whole human being. The attempt can always be 
made to consider both being-stained and being-unstained as a physiolog­
ical phenomenon from the viewpoint of that original essence of human 
Dasein.
The problem of staining or unstainedness, however, is not only a 
question of being “dirty” or “clean”in a physiological sense. It is also 
a problem of the mind or spirit involved in all physical-chemical and 
physiological processes, and thus in an extended sense, it is also a 
moral problem. We are dealing here with natural processes reflected on 
the horizon of the spiritual. A concrete man or woman has this depth 
and as a result, is whole. From the perspective of the concrete indi­
vidual, trying to comprehend the physiological as purely “physiologi­
cal” is to understand the person in only one aspect. This can be done 
only by means of an abstraction. The viewpoint of the “scientific” 
man or woman we described above is a result of an insufficient 
reflection on the nature of his or her own standpoint. This lack of 
reflection is often found among intellectuals (especially Japanese 
intellectuals!). Some time ago, Dr. Butenandt, the German biochemist 
and Nobel Prize winner, gave a series of lectures in various parts of 
Japan. Throughout these lectures, we can detect signs of a serious 
reflection on the character of the scientific viewpoint combined with 
an almost philosophical spirituality. For example, in one lecture Dr. 
Butenandt states, “In answering such questions, we believe we are 
contributing something substantial to the knowledge of life. Yet we re­
main conscious of the fact that in this entire process we are able to com­
prehend only one segment, and not the entire reality of life. This is due 
to the choice of methodology and holds true for every methodology. In 
defining life as a chemical action, there is always present an abstraction 
inherent in every inquiry in the natural sciences. Of course, this picture 
no longer contains any spiritual characteristics, sensation, feeling, will, 
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or any of the values of personality associated with an individual 
life. If we wish to comprehend the entire reality of life, or the manifes­
tations of life in its totality, the only course open to us is to integrate 
the individual results that the various methods of the natural and 
human sciences can offer us.” In his conclusion to the lecture, Dr. 
Butenandt remarks that this work must be carried out with “awe 
before the mysteries of nature.”
All these reflections are quite philosophical. But what is important 
here is that behind the extensive knowledge and the theoretical depth 
manifest in the reflections of this intellectual we can detect one and the 
same source. It is this source that has inspired those philosophical self­
reflections. Visible here is the strength of the European tradition in 
which science and philosophy are bound together.
From the viewpoint of science it may be true that physical-chemical 
or physiological processes per se occurring in nature have nothing to do 
with “staining.” Yet this discovery is an abstraction. Staining or un­
stainedness emerge as problems on a horizon in which natural processes 
are seen in unity with other “spiritual characteristics, like sensory 
perception, feeling, will, or all values of the personality,” in a horizon 
in which the existence of a concrete human man or woman is con­
sidered as a united whole. The locus of this problem, insofar as it is a 
theoretical one, is not in science but in philosophy or “philosophical 
anthropology.” But what consequences can be drawn if we assume in 
the fundamental nature of human existence an unlimited and simple 
immaculateness that transcends both what is stained and what is un­
stained (in the body and spirit), and if we must therefore assume that a 
man or woman can only be comprehended in his or her true concrete 
wholeness when he or she is seen as a being that bears such a fundamen­
tal nature in itself? If we think along these lines, we can see the simple 
and absolute unstainedness in “one-ness” with the stained or un­
stained body or in “one-ness” with the stained or unstained spirit.
Until now this has been treated only as an hypothesis, although the 
previous explanations were only a theoretical consequence of the discus­
sion of the virgin birth. But is it really possible to present more than a 
mere hypothesis here? Is it mere wishful thinking to imagine a dimen­
sion of the absolute unstainedness in the essential ground of human ex­
istence—and in unity with this existence? Actually, this approach, 
which produces the true self-knowledge of a man or woman in the ex­
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istential return to this dimension and opens up this dimension by means 
of a breakthrough along the path of existential self-knowledge, runs 
like a broad current through the history of the human race. This is the 
approach and attitude of that religion which teaches salvation (as a 
means of liberation) through self-knowledge, namely, Buddhism. It is 
also clear that various attempts have been made along these same lines 
in ancient western history as well. What we have described above is 
therefore no mere fantasy, but an approach to the interpretation of the 
religious man or woman that was already widespread in antiquity 
among certain distinctly religious viewpoints, as opposed to scientific 
and philosophical viewpoints.
This approach which focuses on unstainedness as such in inseparable 
unity with stainedness (or rather, both as one and the same) can also be 
applied to the facts of conception and birth. Conception and birth are 
indeed facts in the act of staining. Purity per se occurs in the act of 
staining, not next to it or beyond it, but as one and the same thing. In 
the words of the philosopher Nishida, this can be expressed as “ab­
solute paradox (self-identity of absolute contradictories).’’ Of course, 
such a manner of speaking makes it impossible to think of anything 
other than a physiological fact. What is meant here is the well-known, 
real fact of physiology. Only here the fact is viewed in a different way 
than in science. Science sees the fact of purity per se only as an abstract 
fact.
My approach is different not only from the normal way of observing 
things in everyday life, but also from the way in which ethics, an­
thropology, sociology, and other disciplines see the fact of stainedness. 
These disciplines see only the fact of staining itself. But none of these 
viewpoints can be described as a concrete viewpoint. All facts—let us 
first simply think of a natural-physiological fact—contain a certain 
aspect that cannot be exhausted from those viewpoints. This aspect 
only becomes visible in that horizon on which both staining and un- 
stainableness are ordered and in which they always exist as a whole. The 
mutually contradictory tendencies are one and the same. In this 
horizon, conception and birth are each a fact of stainedness and un­
stainedness. If we wish to express this unstainedness, this Pur it as y in a 
mythological way, that is, if we wish to express “the other-worldly in 
this-worldly terms,” then the only means at our disposable is an expres­
sion like the immaculate conception, or the virgin birth.
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In the sense we have described here, all of us are bom of a “virgin.” 
Our physical mother was such a virgin at the time of our conception 
and birth, for even then, when she was no longer a virgin, she possess­
ed in the essential ground of her being that absolute unstainable charac­
teristic, that pura proprietas. In my view, if we explode and overcome 
the mythological concept and extract from it its new “meaning,” this is 
the inevitable result to which we must come. Stainedness “is” absolute 
unstainedness by virtue of the fact that it is stainedness. As the 
Japanese Zen master Bankei puts it, “We are unborn precisely as cor­
poreal-spiritual existences, by virtue of our being bom from parents.” 
Hakuin Oshd, another Zen master, says: “All living beings are 
originally existences of the Buddha. Both are at the same time water 
and ice. Without water there is no ice. Without living beings there is no 
Buddha.” He says that we are endowed with Buddhahood or Buddha- 
existence precisely in our “profane” Dasein with body and soul, not 
separated and removed from it. This brings us to face with real, con­
crete human meaning. When a man or woman awakens to his or her 
own Buddhahood, the Buddha-existence itself awakens out of and in 
him or her, and he or she becomes a truly more original, more concrete 
human being, a “true human being,” to use the expression of the 
Chinese Zen master Lin-chi. If such is the essence of the human being, 
then both the child born into the world as well as the mother bearing it 
are completely unstained in their very “human” stainedness.
From the standpoint of scientific objectivity, we take it for granted 
that a human being can be born only from human parents. From this 
perspective a virgin birth is pure superstition. But if all human beings, 
in “one-ness” with their uncleanness and all their staining, possess a 
characteristic unapproachable by that staining, then all scientific facts, 
all the facts that we see and hear in our daily experience, can also be 
seen as myth. For the fact that we have been born of a mother—this 
fact in itself—has no other sense than to show at the same time that we 
have all been born from a “virgin.” And if we say that everyday facts 
are also myth in this sense, then this myth has in reality already ceased 
to be “myth.”
In most cases, a myth describes the relationship into which a God or 
gods, or a transcendent encompassing being, enters with our daily 
world. A myth is the account of an unusual and exceptional occurrence 
in the categories of the usual and the everyday. Therefore, if the fact 
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known to be true in our everyday world that a person was bom from a 
mother gives meaning at the same time to birth from a virgin, then the 
virgin birth has ceased to be a myth. This is the obverse side of the scien­
tific fact, the existence of which science itself has not even the slightest 
idea. In our day and age dominated by science, I think that 
mythological concepts can be overcome and myth can be interpreted in 
a new sense only from the position and approach just explained.
V
The ideas presented in the previous section clearly go beyond the 
boundaries of conventional Christian faith and theology. Until the pres­
ent day, Christianity has attributed virgin birth solely to Jesus. The 
virgin birth is a special case rooted in the divinity of Christ and oc­
cupies a privileged position as a fact. In contrast to Buddhism, accord­
ing to which all living beings are endowed with Buddhahood, divinity 
in Christianity is proper only to Jesus. Jesus alone is in the true sense 
the “eternal and natural son of God.” But we can no longer avoid the 
question whether in such a view of things the virgin birth and the Incar­
nation can ultimately be ‘‘demythologized.” In the Christian faith, 
both are recognized as historical facts, as facts that took place in the 
realm of history. It is customary to see the uniqueness and even the 
religious superiority of Christianity in the fact that it is based on the 
historical objectivity of the Incarnation. Although there is something 
to these assertions, at the same time, those “facts” are irreconcilable 
with the modern scientific view of the world and humanity, which 
poses a serious and difficult problem. Is it really possible to understand 
those facts as historical facts even though they are essentially different 
from ordinary facts and are exceptional cases?
It is indeed possible to understand “being-a-fact” in a double sense, 
in two different dimensions. One could make a distinction between a 
religious and a scientific fact, between a fact concerned with the divine 
and a fact concerned with the secular. But in such a case, we must be 
aware that we are thereby establishing a kind of “double truth.” A dou­
ble truth is difficult to maintain, since the truth of a religious fact 
stands in direct contradiction to a scientific fact that one must also 
recognize as true. It is often argued that there is an impassable “no- 
man’s-land” between science and religion which enables the two 
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disciplines to coexist peacefully. But this merely oversimplifies the mat­
ter.
Obviously, it is impossible to establish a religious fact as a fact in the 
same sense on the plane on which a scientific fact is established. Stan­
dard scientific procedure would never recognize the virgin birth or the 
walking on the water as a fact, but rather would dismiss both as com­
pletely unnatural, as pure superstition. Nor is there any satisfactory 
solution in the approach that a fact can be an exception because it 
stands on a plane transcending the category of the scientific fact and 
appears as a supranatural event that has broken into the world of natu­
ral (or scientific) objective facts. To express the eruption of the supra­
natural into our world as fact inevitably requires the terms of mytholog­
ical language which makes the other-worldly into the this-worldly.
Even though the mythological concept is exploded and its sense inter­
preted as “truth,*’ it will necessarily conflict with scientific truth as 
long as this “truth” remains the truth of a special, exceptional fact. An 
exceptional or special fact will always be compared to an ordinary fact 
just because it is special. It will always conflict with and come into op­
position with the common fact. Although in its absolute transcendence 
an exceptional fact might forsake the everyday world, such an absolute 
transcendent fact nevertheless remains relative to and stands in relation 
with that which it transcends. To that extent it is still not absolutely 
transcendent in the true sense of the word. The “supernatural” is super­
natural precisely in its relation with nature. It is possible to imagine a 
field, an area, in which and on which all things must be placed that ex­
ist in some relation with each other and which therefore are to be 
thought of together. We can conceive of an area where this relation ex­
ists, even where the supernatural, the absolute transcendent, the “whol­
ly other” (that which supposedly tolerates no relation with the 
creature) exists. That “which tolerates no relation with creatures” 
always has a kind of relation with these creatures, with the non­
transcendent. If we can conceive of two supposedly contradictory 
things like a religious truth in its supernatural quality and a scientific 
truth in the same field and in the same area (despite the contradiction), 
then we cannot escape affirming the one and denying the other. The 
contradiction demands an “either-or” decision.
Perhaps this discussion seems too formal or even trivial. But let us 
consider the fact that our faculty of thought enables us to comprehend 
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both the “wholly other” and creatures together on one plane, in and 
on one area. This capacity of ours is nothing other than the capacity of 
natural reason itself, which again and again has stirred up so much 
commotion in matters of faith and continues to do so, as the problem 
of demythologizing shows.
When the possession of a divine nature and a virgin birth become 
facts in the life of an extraordinary human being, the contradiction be­
tween those circumstances and truth in the scientific sense necessarily 
demands an either-or decision. This contradiction cannot be dismissed 
out of hand no matter how much the mythological concepts are 
demythologized. Total demythologizing is impossible. This reality 
frustrates the whole purpose of demythologizing, which is to clear a 
path to the modern person.
For this reason, it is only logical if we now stress that the cir­
cumstances just mentioned may not only be maintained as statements 
about a special human being, but must also be conceivable as facts that 
make statements about all human beings. These facts must not blur or 
obliterate the characteristics of “the natural.” It goes without saying 
that when considered from our usual understanding of nature, the 
virgin birth is highly unnatural or even contrary to nature. It is impossi­
ble to establish it as a fact by referring to its supernatural character. 
The notion of virgin birth does indeed overstep the bounds of nature as 
we understand it in the usual sense. But if we view transcendence only 
as “supernatural,” then the virgin birth becomes a special case, and— 
as already mentioned above—the meaning that obtains through 
demythologizing does not escape the conflict with nature and science. 
We are able to think of the “supernatural” in the sense of a 
transcendence of nature only through so-called “vertical” transcen­
dence. Vertical transcendence slices through nature perpendicularly, 
so to speak, and appears in just such a way in nature. But the counter­
positioning of the vertical (the supernatural) and the horizontal (na­
ture) is not without a certain mutual relativity between the two. This 
is clear from the fact that it is always possible to conceive of a single 
area encompassing both these lines. For ages ratio, or reason, has 
claimed to be such an area identifying both these lines in the thought 
process. We may call this a “metaphysical” area.
Religious truth and scientific truth must be mediated here by ratio in 
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such a way that the truths become continuous in the plane of ratio 
itself. No matter how much faith asserts its own absoluteness and re­
jects philosophical reason, it cannot prevent the emergence of ratio. 
For the more that faith asserts its own absoluteness and excludes 
reason, the more it provokes a reaction of science and invites the media­
tion of the philosophical ratio. It should now be clear that our claim to 
a certain kind of transcendence refers to “horizontal transcendence.” 
In any case, it cannot be a transcendence that stands on the same plane 
as nature and becomes un-natural. Likewise, it cannot be a transcen­
dence that cuts through nature vertically and appears as supernatural. 
It must be absolutely transcendent in the sense that it is free and 
detached from all possible horizontals that are present in the realm of 
being (however these are constituted). It need only be horizontally 
stripped of those horizontals for it to embrace both the whole plane of 
nature and the whole world of science as well as the above mentioned 
“metaphysical” area (in which the supernatural and nature can be con­
sidered together) precisely by transcending them. This horizontal 
transcendence forms no counterpart to nature and is therefore neither 
a transcendence in the relation nor a transcendence based on a mutual 
relationship. It must be a transcendence without any relation and con­
tact with nature. In contrast with the standpoint of science, one may at­
tribute to horizontal transcendence the character of total otherness. 
This otherness, moreover, does not entail the demand for an either-or 
decision vis-A-vis science. Horizontal transcendence can be conceived 
of without any conflict with nature.
However, since philosophy maintains the unity of nature and the 
supernatural (transcendence), we must be more exact: by virtue of the 
very fact that horizontal transcendence, in contrast to the standpoint 
of science, is something “wholly other,” it must be a non-duality with 
the latter. As opposed to nature and the standpoint of science, horizon­
tal transcendence is at the same time both absolute negation (in the 
sense of total otherness) and unlimited affirmation (affirmation in the 
sense of non-duality). It is both negative (repulsive) and positive (attrac­
tive) in one. On our way to horizontal transcendence we pass through 
the plane of nature, thereby depriving science of its claim to hegemony. 
From this transcendence, however, we enter once again into the plane 
of nature and so give back to science its true and justified position, a 
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position based on “nothingness.” These two actions are one event in 
horizontal transcendence. It is therefore an unlimited, pure and simple 
Negation-Affirmation.
Let us tentatively call this “horizontal transcendence” non-nature. 
From this standpoint, a total demythologizing can be achieved for the 
first time. That is, the meaning of the mythological concepts can be ex­
tracted from the myth and interpreted in an “otherness” entirely 
different from scientific truth yet not conflicting with it. When we said 
above, in connection with our presentation on the myth of the virgin 
birth, that a characteristic entirely untouchable by “staining” is pres­
ent in the ground of being of every man and woman, we were demon­
strating this non-nature (the “not-natural” removed from the realm 
of the natural), this horizontal transcendence. This untouched char­
acteristic is, of course, found not only in the essence of one partic­
ular, exceptional and extraordinary human being. The same thing 
can be said of all human beings and becomes in this sense a kind of 
nature. It becomes, as it were, nature as non-nature. This nature as 
non-nature, or to put in another way, this non-nature as nature, i.e., 
this standpoint revealing itself in the “horizontal transcendence” is the 
Buddhist “notion of emptiness” (^Gnyata) expressed in the formula: 
“form is emptiness, emptiness is form.” I believe that a fundamental 
and complete demythologizing of all myths and an “existentialist” 
interpretation of mythological concepts are possible only in the break­
through to the horizon of absolute “emptiness” or absolute “nothing­
ness.”
But this does not mean that the standpoint of this “emptiness” is the 
same as that of existential philosophy. Bultmann has taken up the ex­
istentialist hermeneutic as a methodology for demythologizing. This 
has also become the object of heated discussion. But the problem does 
not lie in the introduction of a certain philosophical method. In the 
background, rather, the real problem is the question of the relationship 
between religion and philosophy, or more fundamentally, it is a ques­
tion of the relationship between religion and science. From the begin­
ning, Hellenistic philosophy was marked by critical discussion. Already 
then the conflict and tension between the scientific (physical) world 
view and the religion of the time with its mythologoumena and its 
mythological world view was quite apparent. This brought the conflict 
between the religious and the scientific views of the world and life into 
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the open. From that time onward, throughout the long period from the 
end of antiquity until modern times, ratio, grown conscious of itself, 
together with the metaphysics it inspired, has provided the methodol­
ogy of interpretation in religion.
The antagonism between religion and science was present as a latent 
problem throughout this long history, but it has become visible today 
in the form of a crisis. The advance of the natural sciences in the 
modem period since approximately the middle of the nineteenth cen­
tury has given rise to a fundamental attitude of disbelief not only 
towards religion but also towards metaphysics. The emergence of this 
disbelief has plunged the European intellectual tradition into a crisis 
which continues to this day. Under the pressure of these circumstances, 
the Christian faith has attempted to deny its connection with ratio and 
to establish its own unique, if isolated, stronghold by excluding 
philosophy. Dialectical theology in particular has sought to open up 
the transcendence of faith that paradoxically contradicts reason by 
reducing this historical crisis to a simple crisis inherent in being human.
On the other hand, a complete indifference towards religion has 
made itself widespread among broad circles of human society dom­
inated by science. Under these circumstances philosophy, too, has 
passed over ratio, which has set the tone for such a long time, and has 
turned towards “existence.” It is therefore quite understandable that 
in order to face the new world view squarely, the problem of de­
mythologizing has been proposed, not, as has been usual till now, 
through ratio, but in a more profound radicalization through “ex­
istence.” But does the standpoint of “existence” offer a satisfactory ap­
proach for the hermeneutics of mythological concepts? What kind of 
“existence” is actually called for here? As will soon be shown, this is a 
problem of knowledge that extends to both religion and philosophy. It 
is the problem of the new knowledge that has taken the place of ra­
tional knowledge. And that brings us to the third complex of problems 
implied in demythologizing.
VI
The complex of problems that I would like to treat here has been dis­
cussed by Jaspers in a work that criticizes Bultmann’s methodology 
and also briefly alludes to Heidegger. For Jaspers, Heidegger’s book 
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Sein und Zeit speaks of a basic experience of being human in which one 
has despaired of all belief and resolutely looks nothingness squarely in 
the eye. This experience takes a stance that speaks to the modern per­
son and alludes apprehensively to being. It is thoroughly “existential” 
and in no way neutral and universally valid like scientific knowledge. 
This basic experience stands within a broad tradition that goes back to 
Kierkegaard, Luther, and Augustine.
At the same time, Heidegger's book, through the establishment of 
what he calls existentials (Existentialien) in analogy to the categories 
of traditional philosophy, conceives of existential philosophy as a 
phenomenological, objectifying analysis. In this existentialist analysis, 
knowledge is learnable, neutral, and can be applied to other areas. 
Bultmann has applied it in this way to the exegesis of the Bible. The ob­
jectifying of existence, however, leads to a scientific and universally 
valid knowledge. The contents taken from that high tradition have 
been removed and the whole now takes on an emptied gravity. In brief, 
for Jaspers there is a certain ambiguity in the Heideggerian philosophy. 
The problem is already present in the distinction between existential 
analysis and existential thinking. For Jaspers, what is common to the 
various forms of existential philosophy is found, in a negative sense, in 
breaking through scientific philosophy and, in a positive sense, in com­
prehending a gravity lacking in all mere knowledge. This common ele­
ment, however, is blurred through the distinction between existentialist 
and existential, which leaves an opening for philosophical dishonesty. 
There is no such thing as an existentialist analysis; the thinking of ex­
istential philosophy is only existential thinking. (Karl Jaspers and 
Rudolf Bultmann, Die Frage der Entmylhologisierung, pp. 12-15.)
I agree with Jaspers’ criticism. The problem is not just a conflict be­
tween a certain philosophy and a certain theology or religion. Rather, 
we face here a problem that is unsolvable because, on the one hand, 
religion in its ultimate depths conceals an area that is inaccessible for 
philosophy and, on the other hand, philosophy has within its very basis 
something inconceivable for and incomprehensible to religion. Both of 
them, at bottom, move along parallel to each other. In mutual inter­
course and mutual interplay in the two disciplines, the understanding 
of man, the understanding of the world, indeed even the understanding 
of God are engaged, and the disciplines influence each other with their 
knowledge and cognition. This holds true both for the knowledge stem­
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ming from the realm of reason as well as for the knowledge obtained 
through existence. However, this knowledge is not permitted to leave 
the realm of mutual intercourse and penetrate to the inner sanctum of 
either religion or philosophy. There is no possibility that any knowl­
edge gained in the inner sanctum of religion and breaking through 
from there, could dominate philosophy and shake its essential ground. 
The opposite possibility is likewise unthinkable. Furthermore, a knowl­
edge which could adopt the respective fundamental locus of each 
discipline, elevate it into “one locus” and then make this one locus 
its own dwelling, a knowledge that could join religion and philosophy 
in the depths of their nature, does not even come into consideration.
Religion and philosophy move along parallel to each other despite all 
their mutual influencing. This brings us to the realization that the fun­
damental loci of religion and philosophy (both disciplines indeed 
penetrate to the ground of the human person) are entirely separate 
from each other. An examination of the discussion between Jaspers 
and Bultmann leaves us with the deep and lasting impression that 
theology and philosophy contain something that prevents contact be­
tween the two. Bultmann criticizes Jaspers for not understanding that 
the problem of demythologizing he has presented is a problem of 
biblical hermeneutics. This misunderstanding comes from the fact that 
Jaspers considers religion to be the real relationship of a man or 
woman to that which he calls “transcendence.” He understands myth 
as a symbol, as a secret code that expresses this relationship. Myth 
therefore is an inseparable part of religion. In his opinion, moreover, 
the mythical secret code can only be deciphered through new myths: 
myths interpret each other. All of this clearly shows that he recognizes 
a unique sense of myth (e.g. K. Jaspers and R. Bultmann, Die Frage 
der Entmythologisierung, p. 19). Nevertheless, for Jaspers, philosophy 
and religion understood in this way stand poles apart: “There is no 
standpoint outside of the opposition of philosophy and religion” 
(Jaspers, Der philosophische Glaube, pp. 60-62). He himself as 
philosopher confesses a “philosophical belief”!
Jaspers maintains the existence of a polarity between religion or 
myth and philosophy. Bultmann approaches the text of the Bible with 
an existentialist interpretation. The two viewpoints cross each other 
like two diagonal lines. They contradict each other in the same way as 
emphasizing a unique sense of the myth and demythologizing con­
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tradict each other, or as the polarity of religion and philosophy, on the 
one hand, and the application of the existentialist interpretation to the 
Bible, on the other, contradict each other. Jaspers wants to remain 
within the sphere of philosophical belief, and it is therefore only too 
understandable that he cannot comprehend the preaching that belongs 
to religion by its very nature nor the demythologizing which this 
preaching demands.
At the same time, Jaspers sees that Bultmann advocates an or* 
thodoxy which makes him dogmatic and illiberal. Jaspers, in contrast, 
takes a liberal attitude. From the horizon of his philosophical belief, 
belief resulting from the unreal relation to transcendence can in no way 
impair the free activity of reason prominent in philosophy. As Jaspers 
puts it: “Whoever lives in human reason can not call on any God in his 
struggles with others, but only on evidence in the world” (Jaspers and 
Bultmann, Die Frage der Entmythologisierung, pp. 48-49). In the 
realm of the philosophical belief he has described, belief is closely 
bound up with the openness of reason. The core of reason “is openness 
for an infinity of content.” “In cool clarity passion works for what is 
open.” It is an “atmosphere of reason.” In order to win the pure 
truth, it is necessary for reason to doubt the demand (Jaspers, Der 
philosophische Glaube, p. 39). From these words one may conclude 
that the philosophical belief confessed by Jaspers remains limited to a 
belief without witness. At any rate, he does not include the religious 
witnessing associated with religious belief (the witness of a final deci­
sion that has already occurred). As long as his belief is a “philosophi­
cal” belief bound up with the openness of reason, this is only natu­
ral. It is also only natural that Jaspers shows no understanding 
for Bultmann’s attempt to open up the possibility of an encounter 
with revelation for the modern person. Bultmann, in contrast, main­
tains the concern for religious witness. It goes without saying that he 
cannot accept Jasper’s criticism.
Although there are some good reasons behind Jasper’s criticism, he 
refuses to believe that revelation has occurred in the realm of history at 
a specific time, in a certain place, and in a certain human being. He re­
jects the claim of Christianity to exclusive absoluteness. “The Jesus 
Christ in me is not exclusively bound to that unique Jesus, and Jesus as 
Christ, as the God-man, is a myth. Demythologizing cannot arbitrarily 
stop here” (Der philosophische Glaubey p. 81). Christianity’s claim to 
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the uniqueness of revelation and to absoluteness has its roots in the 
“vertical transcendence” described above. In orthodoxy, religious 
witness (which has already made a final decision and which arises from 
the decision) appears in the form of the uniqueness of revelation and 
the absoluteness of Christianity. According to Jaspers, however, this 
goes against the openness of reason and against the freedom of 
philosophizing: it gives rise to illiberalism. As long as a religion re­
mains on the standpoint of vertical transcendence, it cannot keep 
reason from emerging and conflicting with it.
Ultimately, what lies behind this whole discussion is the cir­
cumstance that religion or theology, and philosophy move along 
parallel lines and do not touch. The debate therefore remains a fruitless 
discussion. The existentialist philosopher enters the domain of religion 
and affirms the significance of myth. The theologian uses the 
methodology of the existentialist interpretation in order to achieve a 
total demythologizing. But the two are diametrically opposed.
But could there not be a religious witness that combines an uncondi­
tional openness and freedom together with an absolute decision? Can 
there not be a knowledge that allows for “an openness to an infinity of 
content” not in the realm of pure reason, but in the domain of 
religious witness and religious decision! Can we not conceive of a 
knowledge that is not a knowledge in the sphere of reason, but much 
higher still, a knowledge in the sphere of religious witness? This would 
be a knowledge that could unite the essential ground of religion and 
philosophy, a knowledge as religious witness. And that brings us back 
to the knowledge we mentioned above, the knowledge whose essence is 
found in the formula “form is emptiness, emptiness is form,” Bud­
dhist prajnOpHramita, the great knowledge.
Translated by Richard F. Szippl
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